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Abstract 
This study involves an experiment where 73 Chief Audit Executives and deputy Chief Audit Executives determine 
the amount of adjustment required to correct a misstatement. We manipulate the financial reporting location of 
the misstatement (recognized vs. disclosed) and the level of audit committee expertise (high vs. low). The results 
indicate that financial reporting location has significant effects on internal auditors’ decisions to correct 
misstatements. Specifically, internal auditors are more willing to waive disclosed misstatements relative to 
recognized misstatements. Contrary to expectations, the results do not indicate that increased audit committee 
expertise and associated increases in audit committee members’ perceived powers cause internal auditors to be 
less willing to waive misstatements. 
Research highlights 
► CAEs tolerate more misstatement in disclosed amounts than in recognized amounts. ► Increased audit 
committee financial expertise increases CAE’s perceived power. ► Audit committee expertise does not lead to 
larger misstatement corrections. ► Internal and external auditors act to decrease the reliability of disclosed 
amounts. 
Introduction 
The reporting location of misstatements influences external auditors’ decisions to require adjustments of these 
misstatements. Specifically, Libby, Nelson, and Hunton (2006) find that external audit partners are more willing 
to waive misstatement corrections for disclosed than for recognized amounts. This willingness to allow 
misstatements may increase management’s incentives to manipulate disclosed amounts and increase the levels 
of error and bias in disclosed information. While external auditors are more willing to waive disclosed amounts, 
relative to recognized amounts, internal auditors may require management to adjust misstatements regardless 
of their reporting locations. If internal auditors do not tolerate misstatements that are disclosed, this will 
increase the reliability (i.e., decrease the random error and bias) of disclosed amounts and decrease the 
likelihood of management manipulation of disclosed amounts. As a result, the impact to practice of external 
auditors’ willingness to waive misstated disclosures could be mitigated or even eliminated by internal audit 
oversight. 
We examine Chief Audit Executives’ and deputy Chief Audit Executives’ decisions to require adjustments of 
misstatements that are either recognized or disclosed. Chief Audit Executives (CAEs) may require equivalent 
adjustments for recognized and disclosed amounts, and act to counter the actions of management and external 
auditors. Thus, the problems identified by Libby et al. (2006) may be partially or entirely offset by the actions of 
internal auditors. Alternatively, CAEs may take the same position as external auditors and be willing to waive 
adjustments of disclosed amounts. In either case, understanding the decision processes of CAEs will help to 
inform regulators and standard setters of the underlying factors that drive financial statement reliability. 
While internal auditors do not face the same incentives to acquiesce to management’s objections to correct 
misstatements as do external auditors (i.e., the risk of client loss), internal auditors’ judgments and decisions are 
not exempt from the effects of incentives (e.g., Braiotta, 2004, Institute of Internal Audit Research Foundation, 
2001, Sarens and De Beelde, 2006a, Van Peursem, 2005). Internal auditors work for management and internal 
auditors’ performance evaluations, compensation, and job security are all controlled or influenced by 
management. As a result, management has power over the internal audit function, and internal auditors face 
pressure to comply with management objections to correct misstatements. In this study, we examine whether 
internal auditors are willing to allow more misstatements in disclosed amounts than in recognized amounts, and 
we investigate whether audit committee expertise can act to limit management’s power and influence over 
internal auditors’ decisions. 
This study employs the decision task from Libby et al. (2006) where participants must decide to adjust or waive a 
misstatement that involves either recognition (capital lease) or disclosure (operating lease). We replicate this 
task because it has been vetted, it allows us to benchmark our results against prior findings for external auditors, 
and the nature of lease assets and liabilities involves little subjectivity and measurement uncertainty. We add a 
manipulation of audit committee expertise (low vs. high) to the existing task to create a 2 × 2 between-
participants design. 
The results of our study indicate that reporting location has a significant effect on internal auditors’ decisions. 
Specifically, CAEs and their deputies require lesser amounts of misstatement correction of disclosed amounts 
relative to recognized amounts. The misstatement correction result mirrors the findings for external auditors 
(Libby et al., 2006). While increased audit committee expertise increases audit committee members’ perceived 
power over management, we do not find that CAEs require greater misstatement corrections when the audit 
committee has more financial expertise, relative to less expertise. It appears that internal auditors may not have 
enough concern about disclosed misstatements to warrant a decision to exercise the power they derive from 
audit committee expertise. Our results suggest that internal auditors, like external auditors and managers, act to 
decrease the perceived and actual reliability of disclosed information. Further, increasing the power of the 
internal audit function does not mitigate this problem. 
Literature review and hypotheses 
Misstatements and financial reporting location 
Misstatements are any errors, certain illegal acts, and fraud that reflect control deficiencies (Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board, 2007, Ramos, 2006). Once auditors detect a misstatement, they make a decision to 
either allow the misstatement or require adjustments of the misstatement by evaluating its materiality (SFAC 
No. 2, FASB, 1980). Nelson, Smith, and Palmrose (2005) indicate that such judgments can be influenced by 
conflicting incentives (e.g., litigation risk vs. risk of client loss). Clients’ objections to any adjustments or 
unintentional income-increasing misstatements also affect external auditors’ decisions, particularly when the 
potential litigation risk in the client’s industry is high (e.g., Barron et al., 2001, Braun, 2001, Farmer et al., 
1987, Libby and Kinney, 2000, Libby et al., 2006, Nelson et al., 2002, Nelson et al., 2005, Ng and Tan, 
2003). Libby et al. (2006) examine whether the financial reporting location of misstatements in the financial 
statements (i.e., recognized vs. disclosed misstatements) influences the amount of misstatement correction 
required by external auditors. The authors find that external audit partners tolerate disclosed misstatements 
more than recognized misstatements when management objects to misstatement correction. 
Schipper (2007) refers to the findings of Libby et al. (2006) to explain external auditors’ speculative behaviors 
regarding users’ reliance on recognized vs. disclosed information. Schipper suggests that one reason external 
audit partners allow disclosed misstatements more than recognized misstatements is because they anticipate 
the materiality threshold is higher for the former than for the latter. Concurrently, they expect a lower potential 
risk of litigation (or reputation loss) associated with tolerating disclosed misstatement amounts than for 
tolerating recognized misstatement amounts. 
Like external auditors, internal auditors face conflicts of interest that may threaten their independence and 
objectivity (Institute of Internal Audit Research Foundation, 2001, Van Peursem, 2005). Management exerts 
significant power over internal audit because management controls or influences internal audit’s budget, pay, 
performance evaluations, workload, and job security (Braiotta, 2004, Chadwick, 1995, Institute of Internal 
Auditors, 2002, McHugh and Raghunandan, 1994, Turley and Zaman, 2007, Raghunandan et al., 2001, Sarens 
and De Beelde, 2006a). Management’s powers over internal audit suggest that internal auditors are motivated 
to take positions that benefit management’s interests. As a result, when management opposes misstatement 
corrections, internal auditors may be reluctant to correct misstatements. On the other hand, internal auditors’ 
stature also depends on their expertise and performance in monitoring internal controls and financial reporting 
quality, and internal auditors’ compensation, performance evaluations, workload, etc. are also influenced by the 
audit committee (Sarens & De Beelde, 2006b). Thus, internal auditors face potentially conflicting motivations to 
please management, please the audit committee and promote reliable financial reports. 
To balance these conflicting incentives, we propose that internal auditors will require more corrections of 
recognized misstatements than they will require for disclosed misstatements. Internal auditors will adopt the 
decision strategy to tolerate more misstatements of disclosed amounts because this strategy limits the potential 
for restatements and adverse investor, creditor, or audit committee reactions that can result from misstated 
and recognized amounts (Scholz, 2008) while also preserving some of the benefits of a good relationship with 
management (e.g., reputation enhancement and increased incentive-based-compensation). This discussion 
leads to the following hypothesis. 
H1: Internal auditors will require management to make larger corrections when misstatements are 
recognized relative to when misstatements are disclosed. 
Effects of audit committee expertise on internal auditors’ decisions 
Internal audit evaluates and works to improve the effectiveness of control, risk management, and governance 
processes (IIA, 2008). Internal audit also helps an organization to accomplish its goals, such as the effectiveness 
and efficiency of operations, the reliability of financial reporting, and compliance with applicable laws and 
regulations. While carrying out its functions, internal audit is responsible for providing independent, objective 
opinions and advice to client-management. The individual who heads up the internal audit function is normally 
called the Chief Audit Executive (CAE), but this position may carry a variety of different titles, such as internal 
audit director, general auditor, head of internal audit, chief internal auditor, and inspector general. 
In addition to its supportive role with management, internal audit assists the audit committee to oversee an 
organization’s audit and control functions (Arens et al., 2009, Braiotta, 2004, Gramling et al., 2004, Institute of 
Internal Audit Research Foundation (IIARF), 2003a, Sarens and De Beelde, 2006b). Prior to enactment of the 
Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX), internal audit’s proximity with management raised concerns about potential 
impairment of its independence and objectivity (IIARF, 2001). Even post-SOX, doubts about internal audit’s 
independence and objectivity have persisted (e.g., Drexler, 2003, Glascock, 2002, Harrington et al., 
2005, Institute of Internal Audit Research Foundation (IIARF), 2003b, Kawashima, 2007, Rodgers, 2003). In 
response to these concerns, the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) recommended that the CAE functionally 
report to the audit committee or its equivalent, and administratively report to the CEO of the organization 
(Braiotta, 2004, Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA), 2008, Institute of Internal Audit Research Foundation (IIARF), 
2003b), and this position has been supported by external auditors as well (KPMG., 2008). Criticisms of internal 
audit independence and potential conflicts of interest still persist even after the IIA’s dual reporting 
recommendations (e.g., Jameson, 2006, Johnson, 2006). 
The IIA believes that effective audit committees allow internal auditors to better maintain their independence 
and objectivity and promote quality financial reporting (Braiotta, 2004, Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA), 
2008, Institute of Internal Audit Research Foundation (IIARF), 2003a, Institute of Internal Audit Research 
Foundation (IIARF), 2003b). To support the IIA assertion, it is important to understand how internal auditors, in 
particular CAEs, perceive management from a power-dependence perspective and what dimensions of audit 
committee power (e.g., expertise) alter these perceptions. 
Power is defined as the capacity or potential to influence others’ attitudes or behaviors despite resistance 
(Bacharach and Lawler, 1980, Emerson, 1962, Finkelstein, 1992, Pfeffer, 1981). Internal auditors perceive 
management to be powerful and may perceive the need to acquiesce to management desires because internal 
auditors value the outcomes provided by management (Bacharach and Lawler, 1980, Lawler and Bacharach, 
1979). However, internal auditors will perceive management to be less powerful if a third party, such as the 
audit committee, has the ability to influence these outcomes (Bacharach and Lawler, 1980, Lawler and 
Bacharach, 1979). Thus, power theory indicates that the presence of the audit committee can decrease the 
power management holds over internal audit. 
To assess their dependence on management, internal auditors need to evaluate management’s powers. 
Currently, management controls decisions pertaining to the appointment, remuneration, and dismissal of CAEs 
(Braiotta, 2004, Institute of Internal Auditors, 2002, McHugh and Raghunandan, 1994, Raghunandan et al., 
2001, Turley and Zaman, 2007). Management evaluates internal audit performance and can promote internal 
auditors to high-level managerial positions (Chadwick, 1995, McHugh and Raghunandan, 1994, Sarens and De 
Beelde, 2006a, Turley and Zaman, 2007). Management also participates in internal audit planning for both 
review and approval (Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA), 2008, Sarens and De Beelde, 2006a). Moreover, internal 
audit day-to-day activities depend on the extent to which management supports the internal audit position, 
particularly CAEs’ stature, within an organizational structure (Sarens & De Beelde, 2006b). Finally, management 
allocates budgets for internal audit, pays compensations and provides internal audit with personnel, 
information, and documentation necessary to achieve its functions (McHugh and Raghunandan, 1994, Sarens 
and De Beelde, 2006b, Turley and Zaman, 2007). It is clear that management exerts significant power over the 
internal audit function. 
However, the audit committee can limit management’s powers when the audit committee has the ability to 
influence the nature of the relationship between management and internal auditors (Bacharach and Lawler, 
1980, Lawler and Bacharach, 1979). Kalbers and Fogarty (1993) find that the financial expertise of audit 
committee members significantly enhances and signals the audit committee’s power to both managers and 
auditors. Thus, Kalbers and Fogerty (1993) find that managers and internal auditors recognize expertise as a 
source of audit committee power, and the power literature indicates that as the power of the audit committee 
increases management will have less ability to influence internal auditors’ decisions. Taken together, the 
literatures indicate that internal auditors will perceive the audit committee to be more powerful in the financial 
reporting process when audit committee financial expertise is higher, and internal auditors will be less likely to 
acquiesce to management pressures to avoid misstatement correction when audit committee expertise is 
higher. The above arguments lead to the following hypothesis: 
H2: Increased audit committee expertise will decrease internal auditors’ willingness to waive all 
misstatements. 
We also expect that the effects of audit committee power on internal auditors’ decisions will be more 
pronounced for disclosed misstatements, relative to recognized misstatements, because prior research indicates 
that auditors have low tolerance for recognized misstatements (Libby et al., 2006). 
H3: Increased audit committee expertise will decrease internal auditors’ willingness to waive disclosed 
misstatements more than recognized misstatements. 
Experimental design and method 
Participants 
The participants are 76 Chief Audit Executives (CAEs) and deputy CAEs. CAEs and deputy CAEs are the ultimate 
decision makers in internal audit. These individuals make the decision to require or not require adjustments of 
misstatements in practice. In addition, CAEs and deputy CAEs interact directly with top management and the 
audit committee. Thus, the sample is composed of real-world experts for our decision context. Three 
participants failed to respond to all of the questions used in the models for hypothesis testing. The 73 
participants included in the analyses are all Chief Audit Executives and the first Deputies to the CAE. None of 
these participants are from outsourced internal audit departments. The average number of years of internal 
audit experience is 13.71. Table 1 presents demographic data. 
Table 1. Demographic information. 
Stature within organization  
Chief Audit Executives vs. Deputies 25 (34.2%) vs. 48 (65.8%) 
Professional designations (frequency and percentage)  
Certified Internal Auditor 23 (31.5%) 
Certified Public Accountant 50 (68.5%) 
Other Certification⁎ 34 (46.6%) 
Accounting experience (mean and standard deviation)  
Number of years of internal audit experience 13.71 (7.98) 
Number of years of external audit experience 3.08 (4.72) 
Number of years of corporate accounting experience 3.10 (5.06) 
Number of years of other accounting experience 0.62 (2.03) 
Experience with current company (mean and standard deviation)  
Number of years with current company (years) 12.03 (8.72) 
⁎Certified information systems auditor or certified internal auditor. 
Design and procedure 
The experiment employs a 2 × 2 between-participants design, where the manipulated independent variables are 
audit committee expertise (low vs. high) and misstatement type (misstatement recognized vs. misstatement 
disclosed). Participants (i.e., Chief Audit Executives or Deputies) were randomly assigned to one of the four 
treatment conditions. The study was completed on paper and provided to participants in sealed envelopes by 
one of the study’s authors. All participants completed the materials in their professional offices under controlled 
conditions in the presence of one of the authors. 
Participants read a case study related to a recognized or disclosed misstatement and were asked to respond to 
the following dependent variable measure (note that only the recognition treatment included “recorded on the 
balance sheet” in the first dependent measure): Please select the amount of additional present value of capital 
lease liability that you would require to be [recorded on the balance sheet and] disclosed in the lease footnote (0, 
10, 20, 30, 40, 50). Participants also responded to a series of debriefing questions, non-identifying demographic 
information, and questions associated with perceptions of the internal audit function. The case materials were 
adapted from Libby et al. (2006) to benchmark previously documented results for external audit partners against 
our results for CAEs and deputy CAEs. 
We adopted the Libby, Nelson, and Hunton case and added a brief description related to the audit committee. 
The additional materials indicated that internal audit reports to both senior management and the audit 
committee. Participants were also informed of senior management’s authority to make the decision to appoint 
or dismiss members of internal audit and the audit committee’s authority to approve such decisions. This 
information was included to ensure that participants understood that they have responsibilities to report both 
to senior management and to the audit committee; that there is at least some level of dependence on senior 
management; and that the audit committee’s background (i.e., size, frequency of meetings, and independence 
requirement) was in accordance with SOX and exchange listing requirements. 
Independent variables: financial reporting location and audit committee expertise 
The reporting location manipulation is the same manipulation employed in Libby et al. (2006). Participants were 
informed that new capital leases were accidentally omitted from the consolidated subsidiary balance sheet of 
Capital Auto Parts, Inc. Financial reporting location was manipulated by changing the type of lease agreement: 
“However, evidence gathered by the internal audit staff indicates that some new [capital] [operating] 
leases at a consolidated subsidiary were accidentally omitted when Capital Auto Parts prepared their 
balance sheet and lease footnote, such that the present value of the [capital] [operating] lease amount is 
understated by $50 million, which is equal to 4.6% of total assets. Management strongly objects to any 
adjustment of the statements and disclosures.” 
The size of the audit committee in the decision case is four members, which equals the average size of medium-
sized public company audit committees (Huron Consulting Group., 2007). The low level of audit committee 
expertise quality was set to meet the minimum requirements for expertise created by the SEC’s final definition 
of a financial expert. This definition allows non-accounting experts such as investment bankers, venture 
capitalists, and CEOs to meet the requirements of Section 407 of SOX (SEC, 2002). The case states: 
… one member of the audit committee meets the minimum qualifications necessary to be considered a 
“financial expert,” although this member does not have an accounting background. 
We create the high level of audit committee expertise by indicating to participants that the majority of 
committee members are financial experts, using a more stringent definition of financial expert that is consistent 
with the initial definition of the SEC. This definition requires a financial expert to have experience preparing or 
auditing financial statements, and monitoring internal accounting controls and procedures for financial 
reporting (SEC, 2002). The case states: 
… three of the four members are Certified Public Accountants, and these three members possess the 
qualifications necessary to be considered “financial experts”. 
Results 
Manipulation checks 
To check whether participants understood their task and their assigned conditions, two manipulation check 
questions were provided at the end of the case study. The first question asked if the error involved capital leases 
that were not recognized and disclosed or if the error involved operating leases that were not disclosed. The 
second question asked whether the audit committee included one member of the audit committee who met the 
minimum qualifications necessary to be considered a “financial expert” or if three of the four members of the 
audit committee were CPAs and possessed the qualifications necessary to be considered “financial experts.” 
Two participants failed to correctly respond to both questions, and we retained these participants in all 
analyses.1 
Preliminary testing 
We included the demographic items in Table 1 as covariates in an ANCOVA model where the dependent variable 
was the amount of restatement correction and independent variables were financial reporting location (FRL), 
audit committee expertise (ACE), and an interaction term (FRL × ACE). One covariate was statistically significant 
in the model (years of internal audit experience). We retain this variable as a covariate in the model used to test 
hypotheses. The directions of means and results of hypotheses tests are unchanged if this covariate is removed. 
Hypotheses tests 
The Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) model to test the hypotheses includes independent variables for financial 
reporting location (FRL), audit committee expertise (ACE), an interaction term (FRL × ACE) and the covariate 
described above. The amount of misstatement correction is the dependent variable. Results for Hypothesis 1 are 
presented in Table 2. Panel A displays the means and standard deviations for the amount of misstatement 
correction (across treatment conditions), and Panel B displays the ANOVA results. The main effect of financial 
reporting location is statistically significant (p = 0.010), and the pattern of means in Panel A indicates that 
participants require larger corrections for recognized misstatements (mean correction = 47.06) than for 
disclosed misstatements (mean correction = 36.67). Thus, the first hypothesis is supported. 










Panel A: Mean {Sample Size} across treatment conditionsa    
AC expertise    
High 44.44{18} 35.50{20} 38.93{38} 
Low 50.00{16} 37.89{19} 43.43{35} 
Main effect: financial reporting location 47.06{34} 36.67{39} 41.51{73} 
Source Sum of 
square 
d.f. Mean square F p 
Panel B: ANOVA results (DV = amount of 
misstatement correction) 
     
Financial reporting location (FRL) 2122.61 1 2122.61 7.103 0.010 
AC expertise (ACE) 379.98 1 379.98 1.272 0.263 
Interaction (FRL × ACE) 12.92 1 12.92 0.043 0.836 
Years of internal audit experience 1135.67 1 1135.67 3.801 0.055 
Error 20319.56 68 298.82 
  
aCell means represent the amount of misstatement correction required by participants (the means are adjusted 
for the three covariates). The variable was collected using the following scale: please select the amount of 
additional present value of capital lease liability that you would require to be [recorded on the balance sheet 
and] disclosed in the lease footnote (0, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50). 
The second hypothesis is tested with the main effect of audit committee expertise on the amount of 
restatement correction. The main effect is not statistically significant (p = 0.263), and the results do not support 
hypothesis 2. The interaction of audit committee expertise and financial reporting location is also not 
statistically significant (p = 0.836), and the results provide no support for the third hypothesis. 
Supplemental analyses 
In order to develop a more complete picture of the role of audit committee expertise in misstatement 
correction decisions, we also examine whether increased audit committee expertise increases internal auditors’ 
perceptions of the audit committee’s power over management. To analyze this issue, we again employ an 
ANOVA model that includes independent variables for financial reporting location (FRL), AC expertise (ACE), and 
an interaction term (FRL × ACE). In this model, perception of the audit committee’s power is the dependent 
variable. Table 3, Panel A, shows the means and standard deviations for perceptions of the audit committee’s 
power. The pattern of means reveals that participants, on average, perceive the AC to be more powerful in 
determining the amount of adjustment to lease liability when AC expertise is higher (1.00) relative to when AC 
expertise is lower (−1.11), and the main effect of AC expertise is statistically significant (p = 0.002). 








Panel A: Mean (standard deviation) {Sample 
Size} across treatment conditionsa 
   
AC expertise    
High 0.50 1.45 1.00  
(3.87) (3.43) (3.65)  
{18} {20} {38} 
Low −1.25 −1.00 −1.11  
(3.13) (4.12) (3.65)  
{16} {19} {35} 
Main effect: financial reporting location −0.41 0.22 −0.08  
(3.627) (3.924) (3.771)  
{34} {39} {73} 
Source Sum of square d.f. Mean square F p 
Panel B: ANOVA results      
Financial reporting location (FRL) 6.53 1 6.53 0.48 0.489 
AC expertise (ACE) 79.93 1 79.93 5.93 0.002 
Interaction (FRL × ACE) 2.22 1 2.22 0.17 0.686 
Error 930.45 69 13.49 
  
aCell means represent perceptions of audit committee power. The variable was collected using the following 
scale: for the case you just completed, who do you believe had more power to determine the amount of 
adjustment to the lease liability, management or the audit committee? (Likert scale where −5 = management, 
0 = undecided, 5 = audit committee). 
Contrary to our expectations, increased audit committee expertise did not result in internal auditors requiring 
larger misstatement corrections from management. However, CAEs and their deputies perceived that audit 
committee power increased when the audit committee had more financial expertise. Power theory suggests 
that internal auditors will feel empowered to require larger misstatement corrections when the audit committee 
has the power to reduce management’s influence over the internal audit function. One potential explanation for 
our results is that CAE’s do not perceive a need to exercise their power in order to correct disclosed 
misstatements. In other words, internal auditors, like external auditors, perceive that correction of disclosed 
misstatements is not as important as correction of recognized misstatements, and correcting disclosed 
misstatements is not worth the resulting conflicts with management. 
Debriefing analyses 
Subsequent to the case study, participants answered additional questions related to audit committee expertise 
and power perceptions (see Table 4). With respect to audit committee expertise, participants indicated that they 
are more willing to challenge management’s financial reporting decisions when audit committees have more 
financial experts than when audit committees have fewer financial experts. However, as we discussed in the 
previous section, our experimental results suggest that this is not the case. Perhaps when CAEs are placed in an 
“actual scenario” where their relationship with management is threatened, CAEs decide that correcting 
disclosed misstatements is not critical enough to warrant conflicts with management. 







1. In general, are Chief Audit Executives more willing to challenge management’s financial reporting decisions when 
audit committees have greater levels of financial expertise, relative to when audit committees have lower levels of 
financial expertise? (−5 = not more willing at all, 0 = undecided, 5 = much more willing) 
   
1.85 2.74 5.76 0.000 
2. In general, do you believe that the financial expertise of the audit committee is important for effectively 
monitoring financial reporting? (−5 = not at all important, 0 = undecided, 5 = very important) 
   
3.97 1.09 31.07 0.000 
3. In general, does the audit committee have more or less influence over financial reporting when the committee 
has more members with high levels of financial expertise, relative to when the committee has few members with 
financial expertise? (−5 = much less influence, 0 = undecided, 5 = much more influence) 
   
3.14 1.48 18.17 0.000 
4. In general, does a Chief Audit Executive have the capacity to influence the audit committee’s decisions related to 
financial reporting? (−5 = not at all, 0 = undecided, 5 = very much) 
   
2.27 1.92 10.10 0.000 
aAll tests compare mean responses to the neutral mid-point of the scale. 
Participants also considered that audit committee financial expertise is an important qualification for effectively monitoring financial reporting, and they 
believed that committee members with high levels of financial expertise have more influence over the financial reporting process than those with low 
levels of financial expertise. Finally, participants believed that the CAE has the capacity to influence audit committee decisions. 
Conclusions and implications 
External auditors who oversee the financial reporting process are less stringent when auditing disclosed lease obligations, relative to recognized 
obligations, in order to balance their conflicting incentives created by the risks of client loss vs. litigation/reputation risks (Libby et al., 2006). Similarly, 
our results suggest that internal auditors contribute to decreased reliability of disclosed amounts. It appears that the incentives of external auditors and 
internal auditors are closely aligned on this issue. In general, both of these parties seem to feel less responsibility for disclosed, relative to recognized 
amounts. 
We proposed that increased audit committee expertise would decrease the influence of management on internal auditors’ decisions and lessen internal 
auditors’ incentives to waive misstatement corrections. The results of our experiment indicate that Chief Audit Executives (CAEs) do perceive the audit 
committee to be more powerful in the financial reporting process when the majority of the committee members have financial accounting expertise 
relative to when only one member has the minimum qualifications necessary to be a financial expert. However, the results indicate that CAEs do not 
choose to rely on the power created by audit committee expertise in order to require misstatement corrections. 
Given that prior research indicates that external auditors are willing to waive disclosed misstatements, there is evidence that most parties to the 
financial reporting decision process (i.e., management, external auditors, and internal auditors) face strong incentives to allow error and bias in disclosed 
amounts. Our findings also suggest that audit committee characteristics may have little effect on the existing incentives or the reliability of disclosed 
amounts. Like Libby et al. (2006), we find reason for serious concerns about the accuracy of disclosed amounts, relative to recognized amounts. 
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